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ABSTRACT  
Impact bonds are a recent mechanism to address social issues by involving the private sector, 
government, and nongovernmental organizations. Among the first candidate countries in Latin-
America to implement such mechanisms are Mexico, Chile and Colombia. However, 
notwithstanding the several proposals and projects designed in these countries to alleviate 
internal social problems, no impact bonds have been implemented yet. This research attempts 
to identify the unique constraints within each country that hinders the implementation of impact 
bonds through the policy transfer approach. The findings show that the constraints are related 
to the politicization by interest groups in some areas (Mexico), the political cycles (Colombia), 
and the level of centralization (Chile). 
Key words: Development Impact Bonds, Pay for Success Contracts, Public Policy, Policy 
Transfer, Social Impact Bonds. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The pursuit of profits and solving social problems usually are considered as two opposing and 
irreconcilable objectives. While mainstream investors assume that it is the responsibility of 
governments and charities to tend to social issues, traditional philanthropic and civil society 
organizations reject the idea that for-profit businesses have the right to support organizations in 
promoting equality, justice, and defending social causes. In essence, it is assumed that creating 
economic value is best left to private companies and that improving social welfare best left to 
governments and nonprofit organizations (Bugg-Levine & Emerson, 2011). However, impact 
investments are proving that these two objectives - making profits and addressing social issues 
- can be achieved simultaneously, and that they are capable of creating a new investment market 
that improves social and environmental conditions. 
Impact bonds are a kind of impact investment that are becoming a popular mechanism to tackle 
social issues and provide financial returns to investors. Impact bonds aim to address social 
issues using an innovative and preventative approach that brings together the private sector, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the government or a donor agency. These mechanisms are 
divided into Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) and Development Impact Bonds (DIBs). 
The UK initiated the first SIB in 2010, and since then, more than 40 projects, primarily in 
developed countries, were established. In developing countries, DIBs provide an alternative for 
addressing social needs because DIBs do not require governments to pay for the proposed social 
outcome, therefore they avoid budgetary pressures from the government. India developed the 
first DIB in 2015 for improving school enrollment of girls. In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) started promoting SIBs with resources for 
technical assistance and feasibility studies through the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) to 
adopt this model. Mexico, Chile and Colombia are the first candidate countries in the region to 
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implement such mechanisms. However, despite several proposals and projects designed for 
these countries, neither the SIBs nor the DIBs have been applied.  
The primary interest of this research is to assess and identify the potential constraints that hinder 
the implementation in these countries through the policy transfer framework developed by 
Benson (2009). In this context, we evaluate the possible limitations of the transfer process on 
the demand side, the programmatic characteristics of the impact bonds, the application 
constraints, and the contextual factors in the selected countries, in order to understand why no 
impact bonds have been implemented and what major obstacles exist for this mechanism in the 
region. In addition, the first SIB in the UK and the first DIB in India are used as benchmarks to 
analyze their transferability. 
The organization of this research is as follows: The first section explains the concept of impact 
bonds. The second section provides the methodological framework to identify the potential 
constraints for the transfer of impact bonds in the selected countries. The third section interprets 
and analyzes the relevant findings to answer the research questions. Finally, the fourth section 
presents the possibilities and restrictions for each case individually.  
1. UNDERSTANDING IMPACT BONDS 
1.1 Social Impact Bonds 
Social Impact Bonds (SIB) have a basic design that can be modified depending on the needs of 
the social issue and the contract agreements. SIBs includes five main stakeholders: investor(s), 
an intermediary, a service provider, an independent evaluator, and the outcome payer plus the 
target population (see Figure 1).  
The process starts with the private investors, who provide the funding to a service provider with 
the necessary expertise to deliver a service that helps the target population. If the evaluator 
validates that the pre-agreed outcomes were fulfilled, the outcomes payer, repays the investors. 
In most cases, the intermediary is in charge of bringing together the different actors, discussing 
the details of the transaction and raising capital for the project (Goodall, 2014; Instiglio & 
Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014; Liebman & Sellman, 2013). 
In order to manage the resources and the contracts with the different stakeholders, a legal entity 
called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or Special Purpose Entity (SPE), can be created and 
included as part of the framework (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; Mulgan et al., 2011). 
Although the SPV does not deliver any services, it acts as the lead organization, and carries out 
such tasks as receiving the capital from the private funders, ensuring the delivery of the 
intervention, passing the funding to the service provider, managing the contracts with the 
agencies and monitoring their performance, and receiving the outcome payments and 
transferring them to the investors. This entity is controlled either by the intermediary or the 
investors. After the investors are repaid, the remainders of the outcome payments are kept by 
the owner of the SPV. 
Depending on the stakeholders, the context and the agreements for the intervention, the impact 
bond framework can vary. The contract relation with the outcome funder falls into one of the 
three types described by Goodall (2014) and Gustafsson-Wright et al. (2015): The first is the 
managed impact bond structure, in which the outcome payer makes a contract with the 
intermediary or a SPV controlled by the intermediary. The intermediary plays a leading role 
through the transaction process and is in charge of managing the performance of the service 
delivery. In the intermediated structure, the outcomes payer makes a contract with the investors 
or a SPV controlled mainly by investors. In this case, the intermediary is still responsible for 
most of the transaction and is contracted by the investors or SVP to supervise the performance 
of the service delivery. The last contract relation is the direct structure, in which the outcomes 
payer contracts directly with the service provider, while the outcomes payer has the leading role 
and manages the performance of the intervention.  
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Figure 1. Basic social impact bond model (Authors). 
1.2 Development Impact Bonds 
The Development Impact Bond (DIB) scheme is based on the same principles as the SIB. The 
main difference is in the roles the outcomes payer and government have in the structure. DIBs 
are designed to be implemented in lower and middle-income countries1 in which a foundation, 
a donor agency, or an international organization (with the support of the host country), pays the 
investors fully or partially once the outcomes have been achieved and verified. According to 
the Center for Global Development & Social Finance, two basic models can be used for the 
DIBs: a direct contract between outcomes funders and service providers, or contracts via a new 
corporate entity or development impact partnership (2013). 
In the first DIB model, there is a direct contract between outcomes funders and the lead service 
provider in which they detail the payment conditions in the case that the service provider 
achieves the agreed social outcomes (similar to Figure 1). Depending on the specific 
circumstances in the target country, a memorandum of understanding between the government 
and the service provider can be made to define the government’s goals, and the way in which 
the service provider will help to meet them. Like the SIB model, the repayment to the investors 
depends on the level of success.  
In the second DIB model, the contracts are held by a New Corporate Entity (NCE), called a 
Development Impact Partnership (DIP), which holds the investors funds and the contracts with 
the different parties: the outcomes funders, service providers, developing country government, 
investors and the intermediary. It is also responsible for the design and implementation of the 
strategy to deliver the outcomes. The outcomes funders and the NCE have to agree on the 
outcomes contract and establish the conditions of the payments to the NCE if the outcomes are 
achieved (see Figure 2). The donor agencies and partner governments can be involved as co-
commissioners of outcomes. The investors and the NCE make an investment agreement 
regarding the amount of capital needed, the timeline, and terms of repayment. The investors’ 
funds are transferred to the DIP which uses them to finance the service providers’ delivery costs 
upfront. As in the first model, the government and the DIP can make a memorandum of 
understanding to define the government’s goals and how the DIP can help to achieve them. The 
measurements and the validation of the outcomes are agreed upon by the outcomes funders and 
an independent organization that will audit the results reported from the intervention, known as 
a verification agent. 
 
 
 
1 The middle-income countries are classified in lower-middle-income economies with a per capita income from $1,026 to $4,035 USD, and 
upper-middle-income economies with a per capita income from $4,036 to $12,475 USD (UNIDO, 2014; World Bank, 2016a). 
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Figure 2 DIB: Contract via New Corporate Entity / Development Impact Partnership 
(Authors, based on Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013) 
2. THE POLICY TRANSFER FRAMEWORK  
When a policy or a program seems promising, governments try to adopt it to achieve similar 
outcomes to those in the original model, which is precisely what happened with SIBs. In 
political science and public policy analysis, this process of adopting policies and programs from 
other public bodies is called “policy transfer”. It is understood as “the process by which 
knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
setting (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political setting” (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p. 6). 
The policy transfer process has four components distributed between the demand and the supply 
side. On the demand side, the policy demand represents the need for a policy or program for a 
specific issue. It can be satisfied by the policy-makers if they search for policies implemented 
in other places facing similar issues, and bring them to their country or jurisdiction. On the 
supply side, once a policy has been found to address the issue in question, understanding the 
conditions and characteristics in the exporter jurisdiction (where the policy or program was 
designed), is necessary to fulfill the supply. It is also required to have sufficient understanding 
of the importer jurisdiction in regards to the institutional, political, legal, social and economic 
context to assess whether it is feasible to transfer the policy, and if the necessary requirements 
to apply it, are present (Benson, 2009; Page, 2000; Rose, 1993, 2005). 
Usually, it is assumed that the transfer process will lead to a successful policy implementation, 
(based on the success of the exporter country), it is not always the case (Dolowitz & Marsh, 
2000; Rose, 1993). Possible constraints that can hinder the implementation are the complexity 
and uniqueness of the policy or programs (Rose, 1993), institutional and structural 
impediments, insufficient economic and political resources to implement the transferred 
policies (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000), cognitive constraints in the pre-decision phase, 
environmental obstacles in the implementation, and the domestic public opinion (Evans, 2009).  
Constraints can be classified into four types: the demand side, the programmatic characteristics 
of the policy being transferred, contextual factors, and application constraints (Benson, 2009; 
Benson & Jordan, 2011). Based on the constraints and their classification, Benson proposes an 
analytical framework to examine the transferability of programs between contexts (2009). To 
identify and assess whether the policy transfer process had any constraints or not, he associated 
a series of questions to the factors that could interfere with the adoption of a policy (See Table 
1). If there are many, difficult constraints (high constraints), the chances of success for the 
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policy transfer will diminish and a form of synthesis, emulation or influence of the original 
policy is more advisable to address the issue in question. If there are few, soft constraints (low 
constraints), then the transfer is more likely to be successful and a copy or adaptation form of 
the original policy can be implemented. 
This theoretical framework will be used to assess whether the Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) and 
the Development Impact Bonds (DIBs) can be applied or not in the selected countries. This 
framework will help us understand why the impact bonds have not been implemented in this 
region, and it will also help identifying current and potential constraints in the adopting 
countries. 
The benchmarks for the research are the SIBs in Peterborough, UK and the DIB in Rajasthan, 
India. The first one was chosen because it was the first project of this type to be implemented 
and because it was used as a reference to develop further SIBs within the UK and other 
countries. There is sufficient available information regarding the design, the role of the 
stakeholders and evidence of the outcomes from the intervention of the cohorts that were 
evaluated. In the case of the DIB, it was chosen because it is also the first project of this type 
to take place. Although the information available is not as abundant as in the case of the SIB in 
Peterborough, the analysis of its design and implementation process are relevant and useful to 
understand how developing countries can use the DIB model and the necessary conditions for 
adoption.  
Mexico, Chile and Colombia were chosen as the adopting countries for this research. They were 
selected because the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) and the innovation lab for the Inter-
American Development Bank group have considered them among the early candidates for the 
implementation of an SIB in Latin America, and because they already have SIBs projects in an 
advanced design stage (Levey, 2014). Since 2014, the MIF has been allocating resources to 
encourage the use of social impact bonds in the region. They focus on developing the right 
conditions for growing the market, identifying social needs and interventions, assessing the 
legal framework, and providing training and advisory support to the interested stakeholders in 
the model (Multilateral Investment Fund, 2014). In Mexico, the state of Jalisco analyzed the 
design of an intervention to move single mothers permanently out of poverty, while Instiglio 
conducted a feasibility study to reduce recidivism in Chile, and another to reduce school 
dropouts and teenage pregnancy in Colombia (Bloomgarden & Levey, 2015). Therefore, it is 
relevant to assess the potential constraints in the transfer process of these countries and whether 
there are conditions that allow them to adopt the impact bonds model.  
To assess the demand factor, the income inequality shown in the Gini coefficient by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014), the human development 
index (HDI) by the United Nations Development Program (2015) and the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database by the World Bank (2016b), will be used. The WDI will be used to 
analyze specific issues as youth unemployment, primary and secondary school attendance, and 
the prevalence of diabetes. These social issues were chosen because they represent current 
conditions and basic needs that are not being met, and because there are potential impact bond 
projects that can address them.  
The programmatic constraints will be assessed by analyzing the structure of the SIB and the 
DIB models themselves. For the contextual constraints, the following issues will be assessed: 
the existence or absence of legal frameworks in Mexico, Chile and Colombia that can enable 
the adoption of impact bonds; factors such as rule of law, control of corruption, political 
stability, and government effectiveness for the period 2009 – 2014 from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) created by the World Bank (2015); the political context and 
politicization of private interventions in social areas in Mexico, Chile and Colombia; the status 
of public resources in social policies, the number of potential service providers, and potential 
investments. For the application constraints, the extent at which the selected countries have to 
change their current structures to adopt the impact bonds models will also be analyzed.  
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Table 1 Factors constraining transferability (Authors, based on Benson, 2009) 
Factors constraining transferability Key questions 
Demand side constraints 
Policy demand 
Is there a demand for the policy or program?  
Is there potential resistance to transfer? 
Programmatic constraints 
Programmatic uniqueness  How unique is the program?  
Programmatic complexity How complex is the program? 
Contextual constraints 
Path dependency  Are past policies restrictive or enabling? 
Existing structures  Are existing structures restrictive or enabling? 
Political context  Is politicization apparent? 
Resources 
Does the receiving context possess adequate resources for 
transfer? 
Application constraints 
Institutional substitutability Would new institutional structures be needed?  
Scales of change Is the anticipated scale of change large or small? 
Programmatic modification  Are programmatic adjustments needed?  
The methodological limitations for this research are related to the availability of comparable 
information among the exporting and adopting countries. For the first stage, there is much less 
information available with regard to the evaluation of the cohorts and outcomes for the DIB in 
India compared to the SIB in Peterborough. 
3. ASSESSING IMPACT BONDS THROUGH THE POLICY TRANSFER APPROACH 
3.1 Demand side constrains  
The demand represents the social needs in a country, and if there are no social issues to be 
addressed by the impact bonds, it is not feasible to adopt them. The interest and willingness of 
the policy-makers to satisfy the demand for a policy is crucial to the implementation. 
Is there a demand for the program? Yes. There is a demand for programs and policies that 
cover social needs in the three Latin-American countries. There is a large income inequality 
within their population. The Gini coefficient for Mexico is 0.47 and 0.50 for Chile, both have 
the highest income inequality measured by the OECD. The OECD average Gini coefficient is 
0.31, while for the UK it is 0.34. In the case of Colombia, although it does not belong to the 
OECD, the last data available for its Gini coefficient is 0.53, which shows an even higher 
income inequality compared to Mexico and Chile (World Bank, 2016).  
Comparing the conditions of youth unemployment, primary and secondary school attendance, 
and diabetes among the same countries, it is observed that the three Latin American countries 
have mixed conditions, in some cases they have similar conditions to the UK, but in others they 
are closer to the Indian context. The UK presents the second highest unemployment rate from 
the five countries, the mean rate from the period 2010 to 2014 was 7.5%, while the youth 
unemployment was on average 19.6%. India had on average 3.5% of unemployment and 10.4% 
youth unemployment for the same period. In Mexico, the average unemployment rate was 5% 
and the youth unemployment rate 9.6%. In Chile, the unemployment rate was 6.8% and the 
youth unemployment 16.9%. In Colombia, the average unemployment rate for that period was 
10.6% and the youth unemployment rate 20.7%. There is a demand for action on this topic in 
the five countries, the demand will be classified as medium-high for Colombia, the UK and 
Chile, while Mexico has a medium demand and India a medium-low demand. 
In the education sector, the UK has the lowest rate of children not enrolled in primary school 
age. From the period 2010 to 2013, it was less than 1% on average, with a rate of unenrolled 
adolescents below 2%. Mexico has on average 3.2% of the children unenrolled in primary 
school, but a rate of 12.6% of adolescents out of school. In India, the rate of children unenrolled 
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in primary school is 5.1%, but 23.2% of adolescents out of school. While Chile has the greatest 
percentage of unenrolled children in primary school at 6.1%, but the lowest rate of adolescents 
out of secondary school, 1.7%. For Colombia, the percentage of children out of primary school 
is 3.1% and has 0.9% of adolescents out of school, however the last available information in 
the database is from 2009. Except for the UK, there seems to be a demand in other countries. 
This is especially the case Chile and India regarding the primary school attendance, followed 
by Mexico and Colombia. While with regards to secondary school attendance India and Mexico 
have the higher demand.  
In Mexico, 15.8% of the population has diabetes2 prevalence, followed by Chile and Colombia, 
both with 10% for the year 2015. India has 9.3% of its population with diabetes, while the 
United Kingdom has the lowest prevalence of this disease, only 4.7%. The demand for a policy 
to treat and prevent this disease is present in these developing countries. 
Is there potential resistance to transfer the program? No. There does not seem to be any 
resistance from the policy-makers neither in Mexico, Chile nor Colombia. The three countries 
have shown their interest in the use of SIBs, either by attending the meetings organized by the 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) aiming to spread the use of these mechanisms since 2014 
or by starting the design of a SIB as such. Mexico, Chile and Colombia have been considered 
as part of the main candidates to focus the resources and make agreements for the 
implementation (Levey, 2014).  
3.2 Programmatic Constrains 
When a policy or a program presents a high degree of complexity, it is less likely to be 
transferred successfully to another country. In the case of the impact bonds, its complexity does 
not show in the concept, but rather in the details of the interventions themselves, which vary 
from one context to another.  
How unique is the program? SIBs and the DIBs do not have elements of “uniqueness” in the 
sense that Rose describes. Their implementation is not restricted to a specific place and target 
population that only exists in a determined space and time (1993, 2005). SIBs have already 
been transferred and applied to various scenarios, in spite of the different contexts and the social 
issues in the adopting countries. The SIB structure can be transferred if the countries have 
similar stakeholders and the same degree of involvement. There needs to be a social issue or a 
vulnerable population that can be helped with a preventative and innovative approach. In 
addition, there must also be investors who are interested in financing the model, service 
providers that have the expertise, and a government that has the commitment and resources to 
pay for the outcomes.  
When the budgetary capacity does not allow a government to be the outcomes payer, as in the 
SIB model, but there are socially motivated investors, service providers and a population with 
deep social needs, then the DIBs are a suitable option. Such features are commonly found in 
the low and middle-income countries (Center for Global Development & Social Finance, 2013). 
The element of uniqueness is not present in the impact bonds model; they are flexible and 
adjustable as long as the stakeholders and the legal and institutional frameworks within a 
country or jurisdiction enable its use. 
How complex is the program? The degree of programmatic complexity, according to Rose, can 
be assessed based of the following features: multiple goals, a vague empirical focus, multiple 
causes for a desired outcome, unfamiliarity with the original design and unpredictability of the 
outcomes (1993, 2005). If these features are present, then the program has a high degree of 
complexity that makes it difficult to be transferred. 
The understanding of the SIB model will depend on the information and knowledge that the 
adopting country has. In the case of Mexico, Chile and Colombia, the model is not unknown 
anymore because all of them have been involved in the meetings organized by the MIF in order 
 
2 This data includes diabetes type I and II (see: World Bank, 2016b)  
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to acquire the necessary knowledge and information regarding the SIBs model. Until February 
2015, these countries have taken part in the communications strategy and SIB events organized 
by the MIF (Multilateral Investment Fund, 2015). The interventions have already proven their 
effectiveness to achieve expected outcomes, so unpredictable outcomes should be limited.  
With respect to the DIBs model, the complexity of the model is similar to the SIBs, their 
differences are in the structure and the role of the outcomes payer. Like in the SIBs, the 
unpredictability factor is reduced due to the proven interventions by the social provider. In 
regard to the familiarity with the model, this model is not being explicitly disseminated in any 
of the selected countries. 
3.3 Contextual constraints 
A policy or a program might be unsuccessful if the context of the adopting countries restricts 
its functionality. Factors, such as a path dependency, the existing structure, the political context, 
and the availability of resources, can turn into obstacles if they do not match the conditions of 
the exporter country, or if they create new obstacles for the adoption of the new program. 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia show promising contexts for the adoption of impact bonds, and 
especially SIBs, but the constraints are to be related to the existing structure, the political cycle 
and the politicization context. 
Path dependency: Are past policies restrictive or enabling the transfer process? Neither 
Mexico, Chile nor Colombia have a specific law that provides direct references to the impact 
bonds. However, these countries have laws on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) that can be 
used for the contracts and agreements between the government and the intermediary or service 
providers in an SIB (Honjiyo, 2015).  
A review of the legal frameworks in developing countries made by Instiglio and Thomson 
Reuters Foundation shows that there is legal leverage in Mexico for all the stakeholders to 
develop and perform their functions as part of the SIB model (2014).The review of the Chilean 
legal structure shows that the political and administrative authorities have a relatively low 
autonomy to contract with third parties (Ibid). Due to its centralized governmental structure, 
any negotiation has to be made by the central government, i.e. executive power, so  local 
governments act primarily as agents, and are not allowed to make their own policy decisions in 
comparison to the decentralized states (Gatica, 2015; Von Baer & Torralbo, 2012). In 
Colombia, although the SIBs are not specified in its legal framework, the current legislation 
allows contracts and agreements between the private and public sector, which can be used for 
the implementation of these impact bonds (Instiglio & Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2014). 
Existing structures: Are existing structures restrictive or enabling? The performance of the 
institutions and the existing structures can hinder the transfer process of the impact bonds in the 
selected countries. This is assessed with the data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI): four factors were chosen to compare the performance of the existing structures in the 
selected countries with the benchmarks for the SIB and the DIB. These factors are the rule of 
law, control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence, and government 
effectiveness for the period 2009 - 2014. The data represent the percentile rank that indicates 
the country's rank among all countries covered by the WGI project, in which a percentile value 
of 0 corresponds to lowest rank, and 100 to the highest rank, i.e. the greater the percentile rank, 
the better its performance. 
The rule of law factor shows to what extent the agents have confidence in society and to what 
degree they abide by its rules, including the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, courts and the likelihood of crime. Mexico has a low performance, its average percentile 
ranked was 35.34, being the lowest rate if compared to the levels in the selected countries. 
Colombia has the second worst performance among these countries with a 43.47 average 
percentile rank, below India. Chile shows a high performance, its average percentile rank was 
87.90, performing better than the rest, but under the 93.52 rank from the UK. 
 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:547-201700012 
The control of corruption factor shows the perceptions of the people regarding the use of public 
power for private gain on both a small and large scale, and the degree to which the state is 
influenced by elites and private interests. In Mexico, the percentile rank was 40.59, which is 
slightly better than the one from India, 36.40, but still a very low performance compared to the 
92.20 percentile from the UK. Colombia has an average percentile rank of 44.50 and performs 
better than Mexico, but it is still low compared to Chile and the UK. Chile has a high 
performance percentile rank of 90.37, which much similar to the conditions from the UK.  
The political stability and absence of violence and terrorism factor measures the perceptions of 
how likely it is to have political instability events and/or politically motivated violence, as well 
as terrorist actions. Mexico shows a low performance with an average percentile ranking of 
22.95, but performs better than India with a percentile rank of 12.12. Colombia has the lowest 
percentile rank of this period with 9.19, which is even lower than in India. While Chile has a 
medium performance ranking, it has an average percentile of 63.42, performing even better than 
the UK with a percentile ranking of 58.20. 
The government effectiveness factor indicates the perceptions of the quality of public services, 
the civil service and its independence from political pressures, policy formulation, and 
implementation, as well as the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
Colombia has an average percentile rank of 53.54, higher than the Indian percentile of 51.22, 
but far too low compared to the UK percentile. Mexico’s average percentile was 61.75, which 
can be considered as a medium performance. In the case of Chile, its percentile rank is 85.74, 
a medium-high performance below the UK average percentile of 91.39.  
The existing structures in Mexico and Colombia can restrict the transfer process, while in Chile 
they are more likely to enable it, due to their higher performance. 
Political context: Is there obvious politicization? In this regard, the political issues and the 
perception of the population in the adopting country can hinder the transfer of the impact bonds. 
According to Marta Garcia, a director at Social Finance and leader of impact bonds projects in 
Latin America, the private interventions in the public sector can be politicized by interest 
groups, the political cycle or internal conflicts (personal communication, June 9, 2016). A SIB 
in the public healthcare system in Mexico did not take place because of the opposition of the 
National Union of Social Security Workers (SNTSS). In Chile and Colombia, SIBs were 
delayed due to political elections. 
There has not been any attempt to use a DIB in Mexico, Colombia or Chile yet, but it can be 
assumed that there are fewer constraints in the political context for this model than in the SIB, 
since the government has a much smaller role in the scheme. In Mexico, the DIB does not seem 
to have obstacles unless there is some political interest group taking part in the provision on a 
social service. In Chile and Colombia, the political issues come from the government, rather 
than the private sector or the civil society organizations, a similar assumption can be made.  
Resources: Does the receiving context possess adequate resources for the transfer process? 
The resources that the public sector and the investors can allocate will depend on the SIB 
agreements and budgetary capacity. For the DIB, the resources will also depend on the investors 
and the outcomes payer. In both cases, the number of potential service providers is a relevant 
factor to ease the transfer of the projects.  
The use of public resources shows the capacity and interest of governments to improve the 
living conditions of its population. The average public expenditure on education in Mexico is 
5.1%, in Chile is 4.3% and in Colombia is 4.6% of its GDP, which are not far from 5.6% in the 
UK and 3.5% in India, the two reference points of the research. In regard to healthcare, from 
the total government expenditure Mexico allocates 11.4% and Chile 14.6%, which is less than 
the 16.2% allocated by the UK, while Colombia allocates 18.2% in this sector, exceeding the 
UK expenditure and the 4.5% allocated by India.  
With respect to the investments needed to fund impact bonds, the attraction of impact and 
commercial investors plays a crucial role. In Latin America, impact investments are gaining 
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traction and are an option for these projects. According to the Annual Impact Investor Survey, 
the region is one of the leading areas  in terms of capital allocated, and investors have expressed 
strong interest to increase the amount invested in 2016 (GIIN, 2016). In addition, the region has 
11% of the global impact investing assets under management, approximately US$6.6 billion 
(Ibid).  
 Mexico, Chile and Colombia have a well-developed environment in regards to third sector 
organizations. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the not-for-profit 
sector in Mexico is composed of 19,777 active civil associations and 3,135 private assistance 
institutions (2016). Chile had approximately 31,399 nonprofit organizations classified as 
NGOs, according to the National Register of Legal Entities (Ministerio Secretaría General de 
la Presidencia, 2013; Soto Coronado, 2013). According to the Confederación Colombiana de 
ONGs, in Colombia there are 71,789 nonprofit organizations in the country (2016). In these 
Latin-American countries, such organizations can be involved as service providers in the impact 
bonds scheme in different areas. 
 
3.4 Application constraints 
Finally, the constraints in the application of the impact bonds could also hinder the success of 
the implementation. Nevertheless, for Mexico, Chile and Colombia, the scale of change, the 
substitutability of institutions, and the programmatic changes do not seem to be obstacles for 
the adoption of the impact bonds. 
Institutional substitutability: Would new institutional structures be needed? For the SIBs, it 
would not be necessary to create new institutional structures that substitute the functions of the 
institutions used in a SIB, like in the UK. There is a current legal framework that can be used 
to implement the SIBs in Mexico that would be considered within the PPP scheme. 
Nevertheless, PPPs and SIBs are not the same, therefore a legal specification of this model 
would be more appropriate, since a modification in the regulations of the PPPs will directly 
affect this model. Similarly, in Chile, the framework for the PPS3 can be used for the adoption 
of the SIB model, but a legal specification or even a specific law for the model would avoid 
future conflicts in its implementation. Colombia has the appropriate legal framework to 
introduce the SIBs, either as part of a direct assignation or a public tender process, while the 
constitution and two specific laws4 on public-private agreements and contracts can be used to 
introduce such mechanisms. For the DIBs, besides the memorandum of understanding, there is 
no necessity to create any new institutional structure, since the agreement is between private 
entities in which the government does not take a leading role in the structure. 
Scales of change: Is the anticipated scale of change large or small? The changes that can be 
expected with the adoption of a SIB are related to the governmental authorities and their 
awareness and knowledge about the possibilities and functioning of the model. The MIF, 
together with Social Finance, are working on the capacity building of intermediaries and 
governments in order to provide information and training to make them aware of the benefits 
of this model and the different sectors in which they can be used. For the DIB, change at such 
scale is not anticipated, at least for the governments. Their main task is the memorandum of 
understanding with service providers and the evaluator (Marta Garcia, personal 
communication, June 6, 2016). In any case, the implementation of impact bonds can have an 
effect in the design of governmental programs policies, as the authorities may focus more on 
the outcomes and building alliances and cooperative agreements with the nonprofit and private 
sectors. 
Programmatic modification: Are programmatic adjustments needed? The specific 
interventions as such cannot be copied, they have to be adapted and changed according to the 
 
3 Public Procurement System of Chile (PPS), Sistema de Compras Públicas in Spanish 
4 See: Instiglio & Thomson Reuters Foundation (2014). Law 1150. Law 1508 on Public-Private Partnerships or Article 355 of the Colombian 
Constitution. 
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conditions and the circumstances where they are implemented. An unaltered education DIB, 
like the one in India, will not have the same effect and outcomes in Mexico, Chile or Colombia, 
where the school dropout causes and conditions are different. However, the structure of the 
impact bonds is meant to be used without altering it, as long as there are stakeholders involved 
and interested in the models and conditions that enable the adoption of the framework. Hybrids 
or a mixture between the SIBs and the DIBs are also possible. 
4. POSSIBILITIES AND RESTRICTIONS 
As demonstrated in this research, impact bonds are capable of aligning financial rewards with 
social outcomes, and bringing together the expertise of the public, private and the third sector 
to work on the same goal, despite their different backgrounds and incentives. Among the 
benefits of impact bonds are the potential savings for the government, the stable access to 
resources for the third sector, and the financial and social motivation of the investors. Due to 
the preventative approach of SIB intervention models, the public sector can save resources 
because the program or policy will help mitigate the costs of ongoing social issues, thereby 
reducing public expenditure in the future to alleviate these problems. In the DIB model, 
although the government is not an outcome payer, it benefits from the improvement in the living 
conditions of its population. The third sector organizations obtain resources to perform their 
activities, and have the opportunity to reach their goal while they innovate social interventions. 
Lastly, the private sector obtains a rate of return and fulfills their desire to make a positive 
impact on the society.  
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Multilateral Investment Fund has promoted the use of 
SIBs, since it considers them more suitable for the region, meanwhile they have ignored the 
DIBs as an alternative or a possible hybrid, rather than a central project. In the cases of Mexico, 
Chile and Colombia, although their conditions do not present any restrictions for the DIBs and 
even though the government is not involved in the contract agreements, the implementation 
could be better, but there are no proposals or projects to apply this model in these countries yet. 
In general terms, the structure and features of the SIBs and the DIBs model can be used in 
Mexico, Chile or Colombia. The reasons and major obstacles for the impact bonds will be 
presented for each case individually. 
Mexico: On the one hand, there are factors in Mexico that enable the transfer process of the 
impact bonds, especially the SIBs, but on the other hand, political factors can potentially restrict 
their adoption and successful implementation. As previously explained, the country has social 
needs that can be tackled through these mechanisms. The country has a high demand for policies 
and programs to support the population with diabetes, as well as a medium demand for actions 
addressing youth unemployment and school dropout from children and adolescents.  
The factors enabling the transfer process of impact bonds in Mexico are: cooperation and 
interest from the government, adaptability of the models, legal structure, and the conditions and 
resources from the potential stakeholders. There is no apparent resistance to the use of SIBs 
from the side of the government and most likely this also applies for the DIBs, since the 
government would spend less resources and be less involved as in the SIB model. There are no 
programmatic constraints within the structures of the impact bonds, the SIBs have been adopted 
in countries other than the UK, and also the DIBs could be in countries with similar needs as 
India as long as the stakeholders are interested. The legal framework of the Mexican law on 
PPPs enables the adoption and implementation of SIBs, and although it does not specify them 
by law, the contracts can be concluded. For the DIBs, the structure used would be a contract 
between private entities, with the recognition of such contract by the state and the memorandum 
of understanding accordingly. For the impact bonds in general, Mexico has a well-developed 
environment of third sector organizations that can take part as service providers. Impact 
investments are growing in the region and in the country as a whole, and those resources can 
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be allocated to impact bonds projects to fund them. The government spends public resources in 
areas like education, healthcare and social policies.  
The constraints for the transfer of impact bonds in Mexico are related to factors such as rule of 
law, control of corruption, political stability and absence of violence, in which it has a low 
performance. The low standard for the rule of law in Mexico implies that the conditions in the 
contract enforcement, property rights, courts and the police, can potentially hinder the 
performance and even the implementation of SIBs and DIBs. Furthermore, the recent violence 
in the country due to the war on drugs, can discourage the investors and service providers to 
work in some areas.  
Besides the structural constraints, the politicization in Mexico in some areas plays a decisive 
role for the implementation of projects. Two of these areas are public healthcare and education, 
which both have the largest labor unions in Latin America, the SNTSS in the healthcare and 
social security sector, and two in the public education system, the National Educational 
Workers Union (SNTE) and the National Coordinator of Education Workers (CNTE).  
The implications for impact bonds in politicized sectors are at a high risk of opposition from 
interest groups and the potential failure of implementation. In the event an impact bond is 
pursued and implemented in such sectors, the interest groups have to be informed about the 
process of the intervention and its goals in order to avoid any misunderstandings. However, 
impact bonds are not conceived as a substitute or replacement for the public services provision, 
but as a complementary preventative approach to the governmental functions. In the state of 
Chiapas, the performance-based contract designed by Instiglio to increase high school 
enrollment does not have any opposition because it does not compete with the teachers or the 
institutions. Also, the SIBs in the state of Jalisco have not faced any controversy because their 
goal is to lift single mothers out of poverty to complement a current governmental program in 
which they receive a direct transfer of resources.  
Chile: The factors in the Chilean context enable the transfer of impact bonds in general, but the 
SIBs have been more heavily promoted and seem to be more suitable than the DIBs. This is due 
to the social needs of the country. Although Chile has the highest income inequality from the 
OECD countries, it has a HDI higher than all the Latin American countries, except for 
Argentina. Its demands and social conditions are more similar to those from developed 
countries than those from developing countries such as India. There is a medium-high demand 
for programs related to youth unemployment, children out of school, but a low demand for 
diabetes prevention actions and programs for adolescent out of school.  
The factors that enable the transfer of impact bonds in Chile are the current legal structures, the 
legal frameworks and the apparent lack of political instability and application constraints. It has 
a high standard in regard to contract enforcements, property rights, and the public has a positive 
perception of the courts, police, and control of corruption and a low likelihood of crime. There 
is a perception of a medium-high quality with regard to the credibility of the government's 
commitment to its policies, the public and civil services, the policy formulation, and the 
existence of freedom of expression and association. Furthermore, the perception of political 
stability and the absence of violence is higher than in the UK. The SIBs can be adopted through 
the Public Procurement System of Chile (PPS), although the PPS has not specified the use of 
SIBs, it can be used to enforce the contract between the public and the private sector. In case 
DIB implementation is pursued, it would not require the PPS framework, but rather a private 
contract between the investors and the outcomes payer, together with the memorandum of 
understanding accordingly.  
Chile has suitable conditions for the implementation of SIBs, it seems that the biggest constraint 
has been the lack of commitment from the government and its demanding centralization. 
Although the feasibility study for a recidivism project started in 2014, there is no binding 
commitment from the central government to be more involved yet and the contracts and 
negotiations have been delayed due to electoral processes in 2016 and 2017. The 
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implementation will likely not be until 2018. The local governments have no faculties to pursue 
these agreements, and only the central government, through the Ministry of Finance, is the 
appropriate entity to take part in a SIBs scheme, because it has a central role in the allocation 
of budgets and is responsible for the efficient execution of public resources (Gatica, 2015).  
Colombia: The factors that enable the transfer of the impact bonds model in Colombia are the 
demand for programs and policies to solve social issues, the low resistance to these mechanisms 
and the legal framework that allows them to take place. There is a medium-high demand for 
actions to solve issues related to youth unemployment and a medium demand to reduce the 
number of children out of school. The country has a low-medium demand to attend the 
prevalence of diabetes. In regards to the prevalence of adolescents out of school, Colombia 
shows a low demand, since only 0.9% is in this situation. There is a low resistance to the 
introduction and proposal of SIBs, since the projects presented by Instiglio were considered by 
the national and the local government. The projects proposed are related to the improvement of 
children’s education, unemployed youths, and youths in vulnerable situations, which is 
coherent to the demands shown in this research.  
Although the country has a low-medium performance with regards to the rule of law and the 
control of corruption, it is better than the performance of Mexico and can enable the 
implementation of impact bonds. Also, the medium performance of the government’s 
effectiveness is an enabling factor, since the investors can trust that the government will repay 
them if the pre-established outcomes are achieved. 
The current legal framework allows the implementation of SIBs even though they are not 
specified in the legislation. The agreements and contracts between the public and private sector 
can take place as established by the PPPs regulation, the regulation on procurement with public 
resources and the direct contracting of nonprofit entities focused on activities of public interest 
and social development. However, similar to the cases of Mexico and Chile, the SIBs are 
strongly promoted in Colombia, and until now there are no proposals to introduce DIBs.  
The restrictive factors identified in the case of Colombia are related to the political cycles that 
have delayed the implementation of the SIBs proposals and the potential instability as well as 
violence in the country. As in the case of Chile, the lack of commitment from the government 
has hindered the implementation and further conversations about SIBs projects. Projects to 
reduce teenage pregnancy and improve educational outcomes for adolescents in the region of 
Antioquia started in 2012, but have not yet been implemented. The project to improve the 
employability of vulnerable youths has not taken place either, although it has already proven 
its effectiveness through a pilot project that is expected to be scaled soon. Another potentially 
restrictive factor for Colombia is its low performance on political stability and absence of 
violence. Of the five countries analyzed, Colombia has the lowest rating, which could 
discourage investors and hinder the work of service providers, like in Mexico. However, the 
country has shown great advances in security measures since the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, 
the peace treaty with the paramilitary and guerillas, currently in the final stages, can reduce the 
restrictive character of this factor. 
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